SCOTT SIMON, HOST:
Assessments continue to change on the damage done to Iran's nuclear facilities after U.S. and Israeli bombings. The latest indicate that Iran's nuclear program could be set back a year or two. Now, Iranian officials maintain they have the right to continue what they insist is a civilian nuclear program. But any enrichment is currently a red line for the Trump administration, and talks are scheduled next week between Iran and the U.S. and Oslo.
Richard Nephew is senior research scholar at Columbia University. He served as deputy special envoy for Iran during the Biden administration and on the National Security Council and in the State Department during the Obama administration. Mr. Nephew, thanks so much for being with us.
RICHARD NEPHEW: Thanks for having me.
SIMON: In a piece for Foreign Affairs, you wrote that if Iran managed to hide and bury its stockpile of highly enriched uranium, that would give them what you called breakout options. What are those?
NEPHEW: So basically, when we talk about breakout, we're talking about Iran's ability to produce enough material for its first nuclear weapon, and then to be able to take that material and to put it into bomb components. And if Iran has been able to hide and then find again all of the highly enriched uranium that they had produced previously, they would have a pretty quick ability to move towards nuclear weapons.
SIMON: And I have to ask - this week, Iran's president signed a new law that suspends cooperation with U.N. nuclear inspectors. That was a key aspect of Iran becoming a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. How do you read this move?
NEPHEW: Well, I think at two levels. First, you know, I think the Iranians are concerned that the international inspectors have given information - you know, even just publicly - that might have enabled Israeli and U.S. military strikes. But second, you know, if the Iranians do have an intent to try and race towards a bomb, making sure that international inspectors aren't there looking is one of the first steps that you would take.
SIMON: You were on the team that negotiated the nuclear deal a decade ago. Over the past few weeks, we've seen much of Iran's defense system damaged. Could this create an incentive for a deal or just the opposite?
NEPHEW: I mean, it could create an incentive for a deal. But I think the much more likely outcome - especially considering how much Iran's nuclear program may have been hidden - is that the Iranians instead will say, OK, you know, we, you know, don't particularly like the idea of being attacked again. You know, what's the best way that we can stave that off? And that's if we demonstrate that we've got nuclear weapons capability - something that they may be able to do relatively quickly and cheaply, especially when considered with how much effort would be required to rebuild their missile program, the air defense systems. You know, those sorts of things.
SIMON: Well, and that raises maybe an overall question. Has this recent war and the exchange of missiles just persuaded Iran's leadership that what they need to stay in power is a nuclear weapon?
NEPHEW: Yeah, that's my big worry. You know, look - when you decide to go into military force to address a nuclear problem, frankly, you better not miss. And you need to make sure that you're able to deal with all the aspects of that nuclear program because otherwise, what you've signaled is, you know, you're defenseless. You know, we have the ability to overfly you at will. You know, we have the ability to attack your facilities and your cities at will. And I think any state would look at that situation and say, well, we need something that's going to scare everybody not to do that. And it's especially the case if you're the Iranians, and if you've already kind of come into the international system with a sense that everyone's out to get you. I really think the Iranian state's view at this point has got to be about, you know, trying to ensure regime survival, and that points in the direction of nuclear weapons.
SIMON: At the same time, let me ask you about the effect of sanctions. President Trump, of course, left that nuclear agreement in his first term and imposed harsh sanctions. Do they provide an incentive for Iran to pursue negotiations and not have a nuclear development program?
NEPHEW: They certainly could, or at least sanctions relief, right? So at this point, we've probably imposed sanctions on everything that we can. There's still Iran's ability to export a small amount of oil to China. That's, at this point, kind of keeping the Iranian economy afloat. But right now the best incentive that we've got to the Iranians not to pursue nuclear weapons is to say, OK, we're prepared to relieve a whole bunch of sanctions against you - allow you to do a lot more business internationally, allow money to flow in, allow reconstruction - and in exchange, have conditions on the nuclear program, possibly the missile program and other things. Fundamentally, that was what the nuclear deal back in 2015 did.
Now we have a little bit of an advantage by the nuclear program having been badly damaged. At the same time, the Iranians now have a deep distrust of the United States. We've already withdrawn from one deal. Now we've joined in a military attack. There's no clear indication we can keep the Israelis from attacking again if they want to. So, you know, all those things add up to being a pretty tough sell on the diplomatic side.
SIMON: Well, and that raises this final question. Given your experience negotiating with Iranian officials, what kind of deal do you think might be possible? Or are the talks just for show?
NEPHEW: I don't think they're for show, and I think the Iranians would do a deal. But I do think that getting them to accept no uranium enrichment in the country forever and ever is probably beyond what we're able to achieve. You know, I think the Iranians will insist on having at least some notional capability. Whether or not they actually execute that is a whole separate question.
SIMON: A notional capability meaning the ability to develop nuclear power for civilian uses.
NEPHEW: Exactly, and that might be limited. That might be, you know, circumscribed. It might be time-limited - you know, you can start this program in 15 years when you have your first reactors being built that can, you know, actually use enriched uranium. I can imagine that sort of deal. But otherwise, it's going to be pretty difficult, I think, to get the Iranians to accept something now.
SIMON: Richard Nephew at Columbia. Thanks so much for speaking with us.
NEPHEW: Thank you.
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